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The 2004 general election was the first major election since the United
States Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),1 also known as the McCain-Feingold
Act.2  The explosion of the renowned 527 political committees (527s)3 in
the run-up to the election appears to have been one of the consequences of
the passage of the BCRA.  A particular type of 527 dealing only with finan-
cing state election campaigns has placed increased pressure upon states to
police campaign activities.  This article illustrates the growing problem with
special focus on North Dakota.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM
The influence of money on politics has been a subject of concern for
well over a century in the United States.  Rapid industrial expansion follow-
ing the Civil War led to vast concentrations of wealth.4  The populist
movements of the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were reactions to the profound impact that those economic conditions had
upon American life.5  The result was a series of legislated reforms aimed at
curbing the influences of great wealth.  One of the reform movements
*Bruce Schoenwald is a 1982 graduate of the University of North Dakota School of Law.  In
2004, he was the North Dakota Democratic-NPL candidate for Attorney General.  Schoenwald
lives in Fargo, North Dakota, and is in private practice in the Law Firm of Stefanson, Plambeck &
Foss, P.L.L.P. in Moorhead, Minnesota.  He has been admitted to the California, Minnesota,  and
North Dakota bars.
1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 2
U.S.C. §§ 431, 434, 439, 441, 453; 18 U.S.C. § 607; 28 U.S.C. § 994; 36 U.S.C. § 510; 47 U.S.C.
§ 315).
2. Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 37 n.4 (D.D.C. 2004).
3. See 26 I.R.C. § 527 (2005) (providing the section of the Internal Revenue Code defining
political committees for purposes of federal tax exemption).  The IRS requires periodic reporting
of contributions to and disbursements from such organizations, but only for the purposes of
establishing tax-exempt status. 26 I.R.C. § 527(j)(2).
4. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957).
5. Id.
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started during that period was the effort to stop the corrupting influence of
big money over the political process.6
The 1904 presidential election was a watershed moment in campaign
finance reform.  The Democratic presidential nominee, Alton B. Parker,
complained that corporations made large money contributions to the
Theodore Roosevelt campaign to buy influence with the administration.7
President Roosevelt denied the claims.8  However, Parker’s allegations fuel-
ed the growing popular sentiment for action to purge national politics of the
influence of corporate aggregations of wealth.9  An investigation following
the election produced hard evidence that several corporations had, in fact,
made large contributions to the Roosevelt campaign.10
President Roosevelt quickly responded to the controversy and the
growing national mood by calling upon Congress to pass legislation pro-
hibiting corporate political contributions.11  He stated plainly that “directors
should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money” for political pur-
poses.12  Bowing to the combined pressures, in 1907 Congress passed the
Tillman Act,13 which completely banned corporate monetary contributions
in connection with federal elections.14
The campaign contribution reform movement continued throughout the
twentieth century.  In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act15 which enhanced the provisions of the Tillman Act.16  During the late
1930s, the growing political influence of labor unions, through their contri-
butions to Democratic party candidates, came under increased scrutiny.
The concern over labor unions’ political activity and the potential disrup-
tion of war-time industry through this activity led to the passage of the
6. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 115-20 (2003); UAW-CIO, 352
U.S. at 570-84 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the history of federal campaign finance
reform in America).
7. Anthony Corrado, A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law, in 73:1 THE REFERENCE
SHELF 1, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 5-6 (Christopher Luna ed., 2001).
8. Id.
9. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 571-72.
10. Id. at 572.
11. Id.
12. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (internal quotations
omitted).
13. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) declared unconstitutional in part in Newbery v.
United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921), and amended by Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368,
43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-248) (repealed 1972). See also Weber v.
Heaney, 793 F.Supp. 1438, 1444 (D. Minn. 1992) (offering the historical perspective of the
Tillman Act).
14. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 571-75 (1957).
15. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§
241-248) (repealed 1972).
16. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 576-77.
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Smith-Connally Act in 1943.17  Smith-Connally extended the restrictions of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act on direct political contributions to labor
organizations for the duration of the war.18  The restrictions upon union
contributions were made permanent by the Taft-Hartley Act19 following the
war.20
Labor reacted quickly to Smith-Connally by spawning a new political
animal—the political action committee (PAC).21  In 1943, the labor organi-
zation known as the Congress of Industrial Organizations formed the
Congress of Industrial Organizations Political Action Committee (CIO-
PAC) as a separate segregated fund (SSF).22  SSFs were made up of volun-
tary member donations, no part of which came from union dues.23  In time,
corporations and other organizations caught on and began forming their
own PACs.24
In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA),25 which replaced earlier prohibitions of corporate and union
contributions.26  FECA also acknowledged and ratified the existence of
PACs.27  It expressly permitted corporations, unions, and certain other
organizations to establish and administer SSFs for election-related
expenditures.28
Restrictions upon political contributions burden free speech. Restric-
tions upon corporate and union contributions have, nonetheless, been found
to be constitutional as long as the organization has the ability to express its
ideas through a PAC.29  The rationale is that contributions made to a PAC
more accurately reflect political views sympathetic to the views of the
17. War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943) (codified at scattered sections of 50
U.S.C., 2 U.S.C. § 251) (repealed 1945) [hereinafter Smith-Connally].
18. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 578-79.
19. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 610
and scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
20. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 567-98.
21. JOSEPH E. CANTOR, POLITICAL SPENDING BY ORGANIZED LABOR: BACKGROUND AND
CURRENT ISSUES, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CRS Doc. No. 96-484 GOV, at 1-2 (1998).
22. Id.
23. Id.; see Minn. Ass’n of Commerce & Indus. v. Foley, 316 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Minn.
1982).
24. Foley, 316 N.W.2d at 527-28.
25. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
26. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n,  540 U.S. 93, 117-18 (2003).
27. Id. at 118.
28. Id.  See also 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)-(8) (2000) (explaining the definition of “political
committee” which includes separate segregated funds).
29. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-61 (1990).
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organization establishing the PAC.30  Funds accumulated through stock
sales, member dues, or from sources unrelated to political activities of the
organization do not share the same assurances and are subject to regula-
tion.31  Persons contributing to the SSF understand that their money will be
used solely for the political views espoused by the organization.32  Treasury
funds, on the other hand, do not necessarily represent the political views of
those providing the money.33  The restriction on the use of treasury funds
for political purposes, therefore, does not unduly burden free speech.34
BCRA is the most recent iteration of federal campaign finance reform.
Among other things, BCRA put an end to so-called “soft-money” contribu-
tions.35  The term “soft money” referred to money raised or spent by federal
candidates or parties for state election activities.36  Those funds were not
subject to FECA’s contribution limits and expenditure caps because
FECA’s jurisdiction only extended to federal elections.37
III. CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS IN THE STATES
Individual states have also entered the arena of campaign finance
regulation.  In 1981, North Dakota joined the ranks with the adoption of a
new election code (North Dakota Act).38  As Table 1 illustrates, many pro-
visions of the North Dakota Act are similar to those of FECA, particularly
with regard to corporate contributions.
30. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1986).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 258.
33. Id.
34. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60 (holding that a state statute prohibiting corporations from
making political contributions out of treasury funds is constitutional so long as corporations are
permitted to make political contributions through separate segregated funds).
35. See generally McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 132-34 (2003)
(discussing more thoroughly the full impact of BCRA).
36. James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: An Introduction,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1068 (2002).
37. Id.
38. See Alexander J. Bott, North Dakota’s New Election Code, 57 N.D. L. REV. 427, 427-30
(1981) (providing an overview of North Dakota’s election code as adopted in 1981).
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The North Dakota Act has undergone various minor amendments since
then, but there has been no significant case law interpreting it.39
Since the enactment of BCRA, individual states have had reason to
examine campaign funding under their respective laws.  Prior to 2002,
political organizations funding campaigns in various states did so often
through soft money accounts of one of the national parties, or through a
committee affiliated in some way with a national party.40  Under that
scheme, even though the soft money accounts were, by definition, unregu-
lated funds, there was at least some oversight by the Federal Elections
Commission (FEC) over the activities of the organizations, because federal
committees or the national parties were involved.41
The situation changed with the passage of BCRA.  The soft money
bans now require a wall of separation between political organizations
contributing to state candidates, and those affiliated with federal candi-
dates.42  After BCRA, the national parties cut ties with political funds
previously maintained for state candidate contributions.43  Some of those
funds reorganized as stand-alone political 527 committees.44  One conse-
quence of the separation was that there was no longer any FEC oversight
over the campaign activities of organizations participating in non-federal
elections.45  That responsibility now falls solely upon individual states
through the enforcement of each state’s campaign finance laws.46  Greater
vigilance will now be required in the states to adequately police campaign
financing.47
39. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1 (2003) (providing amendment dates and
historical information following each sub-section).
40. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 830-31 (D.D.C. 2003).
41. See generally In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that
it was appropriate for FEC to look into certain contributions to the Republican National State
Election Committee notwithstanding the committee’s non-federal status).
42. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(i) (2000) (discussing the new rules as applicable to national versus
state, district, and local committees).
43. See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 830-31 (discussing non-federal accounts maintained
by the Republican National Committee (RNC) prior to passing BCRA).  For example, the RNC
maintained twelve non-federal accounts known as Republican National State Election Committee
accounts.  Id.  Each account was set up to hold funds raised and spent pursuant to unique legal
requirements of particular states; corporate funds were placed in one account, individual contribu-
tions were placed in another, etc.  Id.  See also, John Sents, The New Soft Money: Gubernatorial
Associations Skirt Campaign Finance Laws, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Sept. 25, 2003,
available at http://www.openairwaves.net/527/report.aspx?aid=8.
44. Sents, supra note 43.
45. Id.
46. Kevin Bogardus, 527s Run Aground in the States: Groups Continue to Raise Money as
Some Regulators Crack Down, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Oct. 24, 2005, available at
http://www.openairwaves.net/527/report.aspx?aid=755.
47. Id.
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Most of the states have placed limitations upon corporate contributions
used for political purposes.  Twenty-four states enacted statutes which, like
FECA, prohibit direct corporate contributions except through SSFs.48
Twenty-one states allow direct corporate contributions subject to dollar-
amount limitations similar to those imposed upon individual contribu-
tions.49  Illinois, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia allow unlimited
direct corporate contributions.50
This article focuses upon the corporate contribution restrictions con-
tained in the North Dakota Act, comparing other decisional authorities im-
plementing similar federal and sister-state provisions.  This article also
illustrates the difficulties in obtaining enforcement of the North Dakota Act.
Finally, an alternative enforcement mechanism is proposed.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY—THE CONUNDRUM
One political organization that has been particularly active in North
Dakota since 2002 is the Republican State Leadership Committee (RSLC).
Prior to BCRA, the Republican National Committee directed funds into
state and local election campaigns through a non-federal campaign fund
known as the Republican National State Elections Committee.51  In light of
48. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.074 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-919(A) (2004);
COLO. REV. STAT., § 1-45-103.7 (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-333a, 9-333b (West
2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.503 (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.025 (West 2006);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55 § 8 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.254 (West
2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.15 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227 (2005); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 49-1469 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:4 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
278.15 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.082
(LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74 § 257:10-1-2(d) (2005); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 §
3253 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-25-10.1(h)(1) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-25-2
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132(a) (2005); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN., § 253-094 (Vernon
2005); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-8 (2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.38 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. § 22-
25-102 (2006).
49. See, ALA. CODE 1975 §§ 10-2A-70.1, 10-2A-70.2 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6-201,
7-6-203 (2005); CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 82047, 85301 (West 2006); DEL CODE. ANN. tit. 15 §§
8002, 8010 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 106.08, 106.11 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-41
(2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-204 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6610A (2005); IND. CODE §
3-9-2-3 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-4143, 25-4153 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:1505.2 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1015 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. ELECTION § 13-
226 (LexisNexis 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-13-15 (2006); MO. CODE. AN N . § 130.029
(2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 294A.009, 294A.100 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.3 (West
2005); N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-13-1300, 8-13-
1314 (2006); VT. SAT. ANN. tit. 17 §§ 2801(6), 2805 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.020,
42.17.640 (2006).
50. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Limits on Corporate Contributions to Candi-
dates, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/CorpCand.htm (last visited May 11, 2006).
51. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 829-32 (D.D.C. 2003). See Republican State
Leadership Committee, http//www.rslconline.com/about/index.html (last visited on Mar. 16,
2005).
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the soft money bans imposed by BCRA, the RSLC has since taken over
some of that activity.52  The RSLC holds itself out as a non-party and non-
federal 527 political committee acting as the umbrella organization for the
Republican Attorneys General Association (supporting Republican Attor-
ney General candidates), the Republican Legislative Campaign Committee
(supporting Republican state legislative candidates) and the Republican
Lieutenant Governors Association (supporting Republican lieutenant
governor candidates).53  The RSLC’s website states that it and its supported
associations are independent of the Republican National Committee, and,
therefore, are able to solicit and accept contributions from corporations,
trade associations, and individuals in any amount.54  The organization was
formed in 2002 and was incorporated in the District of Columbia as a
nonprofit corporation55 with no members in December of 2003.56
Between January and August of 2004, the RSLC contributed $100,000
to the Re-elect Wayne Stenehjem Campaign Committee—54 percent of the
committee’s reported contributions.57  During the same period, the RSLC
contributed $10,000 to the Bob Stenehjem for Senate state senate campaign
committee in North Dakota—53 percent of his reported contributions.58
52. The Republican Attorneys General Association, for example, formerly operated under
the Republican National State Elections Committee umbrella.  2002 Republican Attorneys
General Association Benefits, listing of benefits to contributors, Republican Attorneys General
Association (on file with author).  RSLC, formed in late 2002, has now taken over that function.
See infra note 56 (providing references to RSLC Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article V);
see also infra note 53 and accompanying text..
53. Republican State Leadership Committee website, available at http//www.rslconline.com/
about/index.html (last visited on Mar. 16, 2005).
54. Id.
55. The federal regulation, 11 C.F.R. § 114.12(a) (2005), states “[a]n organization may
incorporate and not be subject to the provisions of this part if the organization incorporates for
liability purposes only, and if the organization is a political committee . . . .” The federal
regulation, however, does not apply to RSLC because it only applies to committees involved in
federal elections.  Id.
56. The Articles of Incorporation on file with the District of Columbia Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Business and Professional Licensing Administration state that,
“[t]he Corporation will have no members,” and that “[t]he Corporation shall be formed and
operated to influence or attempt to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of
Republican candidates to positions of leadership in state and local governing bodies.”
REPUBLICAN STATE LEADERSHIP COMM., INC., ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, art. III.  “The
Corporation will not attempt to influence federal elections.”  Id. at art.V.  The Articles also state
that “[t]he Corporation was initially created on November 1, 2002, as an unincorporated political
organization.  It is not affiliated with the Republican National Committee.”  Id. at art. XIV.
57. Pre-General Election Report for the Wayne Stenehjem for Attorney General campaign
committee, filed with the North Dakota Secretary of State on October 21, 2004, lists $100,000 in
contributions in 2004 from the “Republican State Leadership Committee” and reports $184,447.79
in total contributions.  Campaign Contribution Statement Statewide Candidates and Candidate
Comm., North Dakota Sec. of State, Oct. 21, 2004, at 3 (on file with author).
58. Pre-General Election Report for Bob Stenehjem, filed with the North Dakota Secretary of
State on October 20, 2004, lists $10,000 in contributions in 2004 from the “Republican State
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Wayne and Bob are brothers.  At the time, Wayne was the incumbent
Republican attorney general and Bob was the incumbent Republican state
senator from District 30 in North Dakota.59  Both campaigned for re-
election to their respective offices in the 2004 general election.
The Burleigh County State’s Attorney, the prosecutor with statutory
jurisdiction over the contributions, was advised of concerns over the legal-
ity of the activities of the RSLC in North Dakota.60  However, the Burleigh
County State’s Attorney declined prosecution.61  The state’s attorney agreed
that, under state law, “a corporation such as RSLC may not make a direct
contribution to any candidate.”62  However, the State’s Attorney reasoned
that the Stenehjem contributions were not illegal because they came from
an “individual account” maintained by RSLC, Inc., as a segregated account
for individual contributions.63
V. NORTH DAKOTA STATUTORY PROVISIONS—THE
QUAGMIRE
The North Dakota Act prohibits corporations and associations from
making direct political contributions.64  The Act does, however, permit
corporations, associations, and certain other entities to establish SSFs or
PACs restricted in ways similar to PACs under FECA.65  There are three
Leadership Committee” and reports $19,025 in total contributions.  Campaign Contribution
Statement Legislative Candidates, North Dakota Sec. of State, Oct. 20, 2004, at 2-4.
59. See supra notes 57 and 58.
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(7) (2003); see Letter from Cynthia M. Feland,
Assistant States Attorney, Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office, to Bruce A. Schoenwald
(Oct. 18, 2004) (on file with author).
61. See Letter from Cynthia Feland to Bruce Schoenwald, supra note 60.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1) (2003). The statute states:
A corporation, cooperative corporation, limited liability company, or association may
not make a direct contribution:
a. To aid any political party, political committee, or organization.
b. To aid any corporation, limited liability company, or association organized or
maintained for political purposes.
c. To aid any candidate . . . .
d. For any political purpose . . . .
Id.
65. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2) (2003).  This relevant portion provides:
This section does not prohibit the establishment, administration, and solicitation of
contributions to a separate and segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by
a corporation, cooperative corporation, limited liability company, or association.  It is
unlawful for:
a. The person . . . controlling the fund to make contributions or expenditures
utilizing . . . money from dues, fees, treasury funds, or other money required as a
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striking features of the North Dakota Act.  The first is that the corporate
contribution ban includes a prohibition on providing aid to any political
organization.66  Thus, a prohibited entity may not support a political organi-
zation which is not its own SSF.
Second, there is no mechanism to allow a political committee to have
an SSF.  The PAC exception contained in the North Dakota Act allows only
corporations, cooperative corporations, limited liability companies, and as-
sociations to maintain SSFs.67  The definition of “association” specifically
excludes political committees and parties.68  The approach is consistent
with that taken by FECA in defining a “connected organization” as “any
organization which is not a political committee but which directly or
indirectly establishes, administers or financially supports a political com-
mittee.”69  The third important feature of the North Dakota Act is the
provision stating, “for purposes of this chapter ‘corporations’ includes non-
profit corporations.”70  These three features should be kept in mind as we
examine RSLC’s activities in North Dakota.
VI. ARGUMENTS PROHIBITING CONTRIBUTIONS FROM RSLC—
THE CONUNDRUM IN THE QUAGMIRE
The RSLC’s contributions raise three major areas of concern under
North Dakota’s express prohibition against corporate funding of candidate
political campaigns.  First, the RSLC has no members from whom to solicit
contributions to a “segregated account” as required by section 16.1-08.1-
03.3(2)(e).  Second, the RSLC is a political committee or a corporation
organized for political purposes receiving aid from other corporations in
condition of membership in an association . . . .  Moneys from fees, dues,
treasury funds, or money obtained in a commercial transaction may, however, be
used to pay costs of administration of the fund.
. . . .
e. Any contribution to be accepted from any person who is not an employee,
stockholder, patron, or member of the corporation, cooperative corporation,
limited liability company, or association maintaining the political action
committee.
66. Id. at § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1)(a) & (b).
67. Id. at § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2).
68. Id. at § 16.1-08.1-01(1) defines “[a]ssociation” as “any . . . group of any kind . . . which
is united for any purpose . . . and which assesses any . . . membership fees . . . or which maintains
a treasury fund . . . .  The term does not include corporations, cooperative corporations, limited
liability companies, political committees, or political parties.”  Id. (emphasis added).
69. 2 U.S.C. § 431(7) (2000) (emphasis added).
70. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-01(4) (2003).
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violation of section 16.1-08.1-03.3(1)(a) & (b).  Third, the RSLC may not
act as a “conduit,” for contributions to a North Dakota candidate.71
A. THE RSLC AS A NONPROFIT CORPORATION
1. Member Contribution Requirements
In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work
Committee,72 a nonprofit corporation established an SSF for political
contributions to federal candidates.73  Another group filed an objection with
the FEC because the National Right to Work Committee (NRWC), as a
nonprofit corporation, was soliciting contributions to its SSF from persons
other than members of the corporation.74
The United States Supreme Court noted that FECA made it unlawful
for any corporation to make a contribution or expenditure in connection
with federal campaigns.75  The federal statute contained an exception for
the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to an
SSF to be used for political purposes.76  However, that exception was
limited in the case of a nonprofit corporation as a corporation without
capital stock to allow solicitations only from its members.77
The NRWC argued that it issued membership cards to anyone who
made a contribution, or in some other way, expressed support for the non-
profit’s political philosophy.78  The Supreme Court, however, rejected that
argument and held that contributions from the segregated fund were illegal
corporate contributions.79  Membership in the organization required more
than a shared political philosophy and a contribution to the SSF.80  The
membership limitation required that only persons who were attached in
some meaningful way to the corporate structure could contribute.81
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(5) (2003) (“[a] person may not make a payment of
that person’s money or of another person’s money to any other person for a political purpose in
any name other than that of the person who supplies the money . . . .”).  The term “person” is
defined by N.D. Century Code section 16.1-08.1-01(7) as “an individual, partnership, political
committee, association, corporation, cooperative corporation, limited liability company, or other
organization or group of persons.” Id. at § 16.1-08.1-01(7).
72. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
73. Nat’l Right to Work Comm’n, 459 U.S. at 200.
74. Id. at 200-01.
75. Id. at 201.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 201-02.
78. Id. at 202-06
79. Id. at 205-06.
80. Id. at 210-11.
81. Id. at 202.
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Examples of such an attachment indicating membership were voting rights,
management responsibility, or some other significant involvement in the
operation of the nonprofit.82
The corporate contribution limitations found in the North Dakota Act at
section 16.1-08.1-03.3 are based upon the same considerations as the FECA
statute addressed in National Right to Work Committee.  Just as in FECA,
North Dakota’s section 16.1-08.1-03.3(2)(e) places limitations upon solici-
tations to a corporation’s SSF.83  One of the limitations in North Dakota,
just as in the federal statute, is that a nonprofit cannot solicit contributions
to the SSF from anyone but its members.84
2. The RSLC Does Not Meet the Member Contribution
Requirement
RSLC is a nonprofit corporation incorporated in the District of
Columbia.85  The RSLC’s Articles of Incorporation indicate it shall have no
members.86  Thus, the RSLC is a corporation under the North Dakota Act.87
As will be discussed later, most of its contributions come directly from
corporate and trade association treasuries.88  The balance comes from a
handful of corporate and trade association PACs and an even smaller
number of individuals.89  None of the contributors could be classified as
“members” under National Right to Work Committee.90
Nonetheless, it was asserted that RSLC complied with the North
Dakota Act because it made the Stenehjem contributions from an SSF
which it called the “RSLC, Inc.—Individual Account.”91  It was argued that
the “RSLC, Inc.—Individual Account” fit into the SSF exception set forth
in section 16.1-08.1-01(2), which states, “This section does not prohibit the
establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate
82. Id. at 205-06.
83. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2)(e) (2003) (prohibiting contributions to an SSF
“from any person who is not an employee, stockholder, patron, or member of the corporation,
cooperative corporation, limited liability company, or association maintaining the political action
committee.”).
84.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2)(e).
85. See supra note 56.
86. REPUBLICAN STATE LEADERSHIP COMM., INC., ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, art. III.
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-01(4) (2003).
88. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
89. See infra note 125 and accompanying text
90. See supra note 56. RSLC’s Articles of Incorporation provide that it will have no
members.  The Articles do not allow for any significant involvement of contributors as required
by National Right to Work Committee.  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1982).
91. Letter from Cynthia Feland to Bruce Schoenwald, supra note 60.
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and segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a
corporation . . . .”92
North Dakota’s SSF or PAC exception is modeled after the federal SSF
exception found at 2 U.S.C. section 441b(b)(2)(C).93  Both the federal
statute and the North Dakota Act place specific limitations upon the sources
of contributions to the SSF.94  Under both statutory schemes, the
contributions must come from individuals who have some membership
affiliation or other specified relationship to the connected organization.95  In
the case of the RSLC, however, no contributor to the “RSLC,
Inc.—Individual Account” had a qualifying relationship with the RSLC or
its SSF.96
3. The RSLC’s Corporate Status Creates an Issue
The RSLC, as a nonprofit corporation, is a “corporation” for purposes
of the North Dakota Act.97  The argument may be advanced, however, that
the RSLC is merely a political committee incorporated for only liability
purposes, and that it should enjoy an exemption from the anti-corporate
contribution statute.98  Federal regulations allow just such an exemption for
incorporated political committees subject to federal control.99  Some of the
states which ban direct corporate contributions also permit the incorporation
of political committees.100  North Dakota, however, is not one of those
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-01(2) (2003).
93. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2004).  This section provides that the ban on corporate
political contributions and expenditures does not extend to “the establishment, administration, and
solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a
corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without
capital stock.” Id.
94. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(C) states, “[t]his paragraph shall not prevent a membership
organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock, or a separate segregated fund
established by a membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock, from
soliciting contributions to such a fund from members of such organization, cooperative, or
corporation without capital stock.” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(C) (2004).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2)(e) states, “[i]t is unlawful for . . . [a]ny contribution to
be accepted from any person who is not an employee, stockholder, patron, or member of the
corporation. . . maintaining the political action committee.” N.D. CENT. C ODE § 16.1-08.1-
03.3(2)(e) (2003).
95. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2004); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2)(e)
(2003).
96. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
97. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-01(4) (2003) (including “nonprofit corporations” in
definitions of corporations as used in this chapter).  
98. E.g., 11 C.F.R. § 114.12(a) (2005) (allowing political committees to incorporate for
liability purposes under FECA)
99. 11 C.F.R. § 114.12(a).
100. For example, in Arizona, the statute states that  “[i]t is unlawful for a corporation . . . to
make any contribution . . . for the purpose of influencing an election . . . .  This subsection does
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states.101  Moreover, North Dakota also forbids contributions from nonprofit
corporations and other limited liability companies.102  The argument that
there is no incorporated political committee exemption under the North
Dakota Act is compelling in light of the fact that the exemption is expressly
included in other statutory schemes and absent in the North Dakota Act.103
North Dakota’s express ban on nonprofit corporate contributions further
bolsters the argument against the legality of the RSLC contributions.104
B. THE RSLC AS A POLITICAL COMMITTEE
Even if we disregard the corporate status of RSLC and consider it
simply as a 527 political committee, it still cannot maintain an SSF for use
in North Dakota. 105  Section 16.1-08.1-03.3(2) of the North Dakota Century
not apply to political committees that are incorporated . . . .”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-919A
(2004).  In Pennsylvania, the statute states, “It is unlawful for any . . . corporation, . . . except
those corporations formed primarily for political purposes or as a political committee, to make a
contribution or expenditure in connection with the election of any candidate . . . .”  PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 3253(a) (West 2005).  In Texas, the statute reads, “If a political committee the only
principal purpose of which is accepting political contributions and making political expenditures
incorporates for liability purposes only, the committee is not considered to be a corporation for
purposes of this subchapter.” TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.092 (Vernon 2005).  Oklahoma
allows the incorporation of political committees if no more than 10 percent of the committee’s
contributions come from corporations. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74 § 257:10-1-2(d)(5) (2005).  Five
other direct corporate contribution-banning states also allow for the incorporation of political
committees.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.254(2) (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 49-
1413, 49-1438 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19(g) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3517.01(19) (LexisNexis 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132(b) (2005).
101.  See supra note 97.
102. See id. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16.1-08.1-01(4), 16.1-08.1-03.3(1) (prohibiting for profit
and nonprofit corporations and other limited liability companies from making direct political
contributions).  In Fed. Election Comm’n v.  Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., it was held that a
provision of FECA prohibiting direct corporate political contributions violated free speech rights
as applied to nonprofit corporations which (1) are formed to promote certain political ideas, (2)
have no shareholders, and (3) do not receive contributions from business corporations. 479 U.S.
238, 263-64 (1986).  The Supreme Court reasoned that there is little danger of corrupting the
political process where the contributors know the political nature of the entity to which they are
contributing.  Id.  Funding of such an organization reflects political views sympathetic to those
views of the organization which is soliciting money in order to advance such views.  Id. at 262-64.
There is no constitutional question here, however, because RSLC appears to receive a large
percentage of its contributions directly from business corporations.  See infra note 125 and
accompanying text.  The real question here, as in National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S.
197 (1982), is who may contribute to a nonprofit’s SSF?
103.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text and note 102.
104.  See supra note 102.
105. See Op. Att’y Gen. N.D. L-150 (1996) [hereinafter Letter Opinion 96-L-150].  Then-
Attorney General Heidi Heitkamp was asked whether a 527 known as the Democratic Governors’
Association was an “association,” requiring an SSF for making political contributions, or whether
it is a “political committee,” able to make direct political contributions under the North Dakota
Act.  Id.  Heitkamp opined that, due to the fundamentally political nature of the organization, it
was a political committee for purposes of the Act.  Id.  If the same analysis is applied here and
corporate status is ignored, RSLC would likely be deemed a “political committee” able to make
direct political contributions assuming it obtains its funds from legal sources.  Id.  Heitkamp’s
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Code provides that an SSF may only be established by a “corporation,
cooperative corporation, limited liability company, or association.”106  The
term association is expressly defined to include labor unions and trade asso-
ciations, for example, and to exclude political committees and parties.107  A
political committee cannot have an SSF; or to put it another way, a PAC
cannot have a PAC.108
1. Nonconnected Committees
The RSLC may assert that the “RSLC, Inc.—Individual Account”
should be considered to be a nonconnected committee, and, therefore, is not
subject to the member contribution requirement.  A nonconnected commit-
tee is a political committee allowable under federal campaign finance law
that is not a party committee, a candidate committee, or an SSF established
by a corporation or labor organization.109
A nonconnected committee differs from an SSF in at least three
respects.  First, a nonconnected committee has no connected organization,
such as a corporation or a labor union, while an SSF does.110  Second, any
support provided to a nonconnected committee by a sponsoring organi-
zation, such as the payment of administrative expenses, is considered to be
a contribution to the committee subject to the same contribution limitations
and prohibitions as other money contributions.111  In contrast, an SSF may
receive unlimited administrative support from its connected organization.112
Third, a nonconnected committee may solicit contributions from anyone in
the general public who may lawfully make political contributions, whereas
an SSF may only solicit contributions from individuals having specific
opinion did not address any issue concerning the source of funds used by the Democratic
Governors’ Association. Id.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2) (2003).
107. Id. at § 16.1-08.1-01(1).
108. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.6(a) (2005) (stating that “‘[c]onnected organization’ means any
organization which is not a political committee but which directly or indirectly establishes,
administers, or financially supports a political committee.”); 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (b) (2005) (stating
that “[a]ny separate segregated fund . . . is a political committee.”).  Thus, even under FECA, a
political committee may not have a connected SSF or PAC.  11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (b).
109. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(a) (2005) (indicating the propriety of such committees has been
recognized by the FEC if the committee is not controlled or financially supported by the forming
organization).  See also Darryl Wold, Fed. Election Comm’n Adv. Op. No. 2000-20 (Sept. 15,
2000), available at http:/ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/20020.html (providing a discussion of the
requirements for the establishment of nonconnected committees).
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relationships to the connected organization.113  The primary advantage of a
nonconnected PAC is that it can solicit contributions from a broader pool of
contributors.114  The main disadvantage is that it has no parent organization
to pay its administrative costs.115
In North Dakota, the RSLC is being treated to the best of both worlds.
On one hand, by treating the account like a nonconnected committee, it is
allowed to solicit from a broad pool of non-member contributors to the
“RSLC, Inc.—Individual Account.”116  On the other, like a connected PAC,
the RSLC administers and controls the account.117  However, even if non-
connected committees were provided for under North Dakota law, the
“RSLC, Inc.—Individual Account” does not fit the model.118
2. Affiliated Committees
FECA states “[f]or purposes of the limitations . . . [on political
contributions], all contributions made by political committees established or
financed or maintained or controlled by any corporation, labor organization,
or any other person, . . . or by any group of such persons, shall be
considered to have been made by a single political committee . . . .”119
The rules interpreting FECA state:
[A]ll contributions made or received by more than one affiliated
committee, regardless of whether they are political committees . . .
shall be considered to be made or received by a single political
committee.  [A]ll contributions made or received by the following
committees shall be considered to be made or received by a single
political committee . . . [c]ommittees (including a separate segre-
gated fund, . . .) established, financed, maintained or controlled by
113. Id.
114. Weinstein, supra note 36, at 1065 n.61.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 108.
118. It could be argued that RSLC is itself a nonconnected committee allowing it to solicit
from a broad group of non-member contributors.  See supra note 110-13 and accompanying text.
Even assuming, however, that nonconnected committees are recognized under state law, the
“RSLC, Inc.—Individual Account” still cannot be an SSF.  As discussed earlier, a political com-
mittee, including a nonconnected committee, may not have its own SSF.  See supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
119. See  2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (2005). For purposes of FECA, “person” means “an
individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, and any other
organization, or group of persons, but does not include the Federal government or any authority of
the Federal government.  11 C.F.R. § 100.10 (2005).
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the same corporation, labor organization, person or group of
persons . . . .120
In other words, all of the political committees or SSFs set up by the
same group of persons are treated as the same political committee.121
120. 11 C.F.R. §110.3(a)(1) (2005).  See also 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2005).  The relevant portion
states:
Political committee means any group meeting one of the following conditions:
. . . .
(b) Any separate segregated fund . . . is a political committee.
. . . .
(g) Affiliated committee.
(2) All committees (including a separate segregated fund . . .) established, fi-
nanced, maintained or controlled by the same corporation, labor organization,
person, or group of persons, including any parent, subsidiary, branch, division,
department, or local unit thereof, are affiliated . . .
(3) Affiliated committees sharing a single contribution limitation under para-
graph (g)(2) of this section include all of the committees established, financed,
maintained or controlled by—
. . . ;
(v) The same person or group of persons.
. . . .
(4)(ii) In determining whether committees . . . are affiliated, the [FEC] will
consider the [following factors] . . . in the context of the over all relationship
between committees or sponsoring organizations to determine whether the
presence of any factor or factors is evidence of one committee or organization
having been established, financed, maintained or controlled by another
committee or sponsoring organization. . . :
. . . .
(C) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee has the
authority or ability to hire, appoint, demote, or otherwise control the
officers, or other decisionmaking employees or members of another
sponsoring organization or committee;
. . . ;
(E) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee has common or
overlapping officers or employees with another sponsoring
organization or committee which indicates a formal or ongoing
relationship between the sponsoring organizations or committees;
. . . ;
(G) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee provides funds
or goods in a significant amount or on an ongoing basis to another
sponsoring organization or committee such as through direct or
indirect payments for administrative, fundraising, or other costs. . . ;
(H) Whether a sponsoring organization or committee causes or
arranges for funds in a significant amount or on a ongoing basis to be
provided to another sponsoring organization or committee. . . ;
(I) Whether a sponsoring organization or a committee or its agent
had an active or significant role in the formation of another
sponsoring organization or committee; and
(J) Whether the sponsoring organization or committees have similar
patterns of contributions or contributors which indicates a formal or
ongoing relationship between the sponsoring organizations or
committees.
11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2005).
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Accordingly, under FECA, all accounts set up and maintained by a political
committee, such as the RSLC, would be deemed affiliated.122  As such, the
RSLC and all of its accounts would be deemed to be a single political
committee for contribution purposes.
The same rationale should be applicable under the North Dakota Act.
The “RSLC, Inc.—Individual Account,” which was purported to have been
an SSF, is actually an affiliated committee.  The RSLC, and all of its funds
encompassed within, is considered to be a single political committee.  None
of its funds should be segregated for contribution purposes.  The corporate
contributions it receives taint all of its funds.
3. Corporate Contributions to the RSLC Violate State Law
The North Dakota Act prohibits direct contributions from corporations
or associations “to aid any . . . political committee, or organization . . .
corporation, limited liability company, or association organized or main-
tained for political purposes.”123
Like other 527s, the RSLC is required to file periodic Form 8872
reports of contributions and expenditures with the IRS.124  Based upon
those reports, from the date of its formation through the date of its last
report before the November 2004 general election, the RSLC took in over
$8.7 million in contributions.125  Approximately 93% of those contributions
were from corporations and associations, and 5% came from PAC’s.126
Only 2% constituted individual contributions. 127 Only the individual and
PAC contributions would be lawful under the North Dakota Act if made
directly.128
121. See Walther v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 468 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (D.D.C. 1979) (inter-
preting FECA’s affiliation rules to mean “if two or more PACs are controlled by one person or
group of persons, then the PACs should be treated as one PAC for purposes of controlling political
contributions).
122. Id.
123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1) (2003).
124. See 26 U.S.C. § 527(j) (2005) (requiring periodic reporting of all contributions and
disbursements by political committees claiming tax-exempt status).
125. According to figures compiled by author from the RSLC Form 8872, filings covering
the period from July 1, 2002, through October 13, 2004, RSLC reported a total of $8,726,579 in
contributions.  $8,091,451 of that amount appears to be direct contributions from corporations and
trade associations.  $435,238 was from PACs and $199,890 was from individuals.  See Form 8872
filings for RSLC covering periods from July 1, 2002, through October 13, 2004 (on file with the
IRS) (compilations on file with author).
126. See supra note 125.
127. Id.
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (2003).
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According to the Form 8872 reports, during that same period of time,
the RSLC paid over $4 million in salaries and administrative expenses.129
Most, if not all, of the money for administration came from the corpo-
rate/association contributions.130  Corporations are supporting the RSLC, a
corporation organized for political purposes.  The corporate support of the
RSLC renders it activities in North Dakota unlawful.
A similar situation was prohibited in Arizona State Democratic Party v.
State.131  There, the Arizona Democratic Party solicited and accepted dona-
tions from corporations and labor unions to pay its operating expenses such
as rent, payroll, utilities, insurance, supplies, and other overhead and admin-
istrative expenses.132  Like North Dakota, Arizona prohibited direct corpo-
rate and union contributions for political purposes.133  The Arizona Demo-
cratic Party, nonetheless, contended that the practice did not violate state
law because it maintained a segregated account for individual donations
used for campaign funding.134  The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that the law prohibiting direct corporate and union contributions
also applied to contributions used solely for administrative support of a
political organization.135
Outside corporate contributions may not be used to pay administrative
costs of a political committee even if individual contributions are segre-
gated for political use.136  The SSF exception does not apply because the
North Dakota Act only allows a corporation or association to pay admini-
strative expenses for its own SSF.137  Although the North Dakota Act does
not prohibit the existence of the RSLC as a non-North Dakota entity,
RSLC’s funds are tainted because corporations and associations have made
direct contributions to it as aid to a “political committee” or as a corporation
or association “organized or maintained for political purposes.”138
C. THE RSLC MAY NOT ACT AS A “CONDUIT” FOR CONTRIBUTIONS
TO A NORTH DAKOTA CANDIDATE
North Dakota Century Code section 16.1-08.1-03.3(5) states:
129. See Form 8872 filings for RSLC covering periods from July 1, 2002, through October
13, 2004 (on file with the IRS) (compilations on file with author).
130. Id.
131. 98 P.3d 214 (Ariz. App. 2004).
132. Arizona State Democratic Party, 98 P.3d at 216-17.
133. Id. at 217, 222-23.
134. Id. at 216-17.
135. Id. at 226.
136. Id.
137. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 16.1-08.1-3.3(2)(a) (2003).
138. Id. at § 16.1-08.1-3.3(1)(a) & (b).
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A person may not make a payment of that person’s money or of
another person’s money to any other person for a political purpose
in any name other than that of the person who supplies the money
and a person may not knowingly receive the payment nor enter nor
cause the payment to be entered in that person’s account or record
in any name other than that of the person by whom it actually was
furnished.139
The term “person” is defined broadly by the North Dakota Act as “an
individual, . . . political committee, association, corporation, . . . or other
organization or group of persons.140
If contributions to the Stenehjem campaigns were made from the few
individual contributions to the RSLC, those funds should have been denoted
and recorded as such from the person who actually supplied the money.
However the contribution reports filed with the North Dakota Secretary of
State by the Stenehjem campaign committees list the contributions from
RSLC in its own name.141
The Burleigh County State’s Attorney agreed that the RSLC may not
make direct contributions to a candidate in North Dakota.142  However, the
State’s Attorney observed that a “corporation may utilize individual contri-
butions for political purposes if said corporation establishes and administers
a separate and segregated fund which contains only individual contribu-
tions.”143  The Stenehjem contributions were purportedly made from such
an account.144  If the account is not an SSF, it could be argued that it con-
sists of “conduit” or “earmarked” contributions such as discussed under the
Federal Act.  11 C.F.R. section 110.6 regulates interpretation of the Federal
Act concerning such contributions. 145  It states in relevant part:
(a) All contributions by a person made on behalf of or to a
candidate, including contributions which are in any way earmarked
or otherwise directed to the candidate through an intermediary or
conduit, are contributions from the person to the candidate.
(b)(2)(ii) Any person who is prohibited from making contributions
or expenditures in connection with an election for Federal office
139. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(5).
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-01(7).
141. Campaign Contribution Statement Statewide Candidates and Candidate Comm., North
Dakota Sec’y of State, Oct. 21, 2004, at 3 (on file with author); Campaign Contribution Statement
Legislative Candidiates, North Dakota Sec’y Of State, Oct. 20, 2004 , at 2-4 (on file with author).
142. Letter from Cynthia Feland to Bruce Schoenwald, supra note 60.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6 (2005).
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shall be prohibited from acting as a conduit for contributions
earmarked to candidates or their authorized committees.146
In other words, a corporation may not act as a conduit.
Federal Election Commission v. Harman147 is a case illustrating that
concept.  In Harman, an employee of Hughes Aircraft Company solicited
and collected approximately $20,000 in individual employee contributions
for a congressional candidate.148  The contributions were challenged by the
FEC as a violation of 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(2)(ii).149  The court agreed,
holding that the corporation acted as an unlawful conduit or intermediary
for the contributions.150  The court reasoned that the action of the corporate
employee in collecting the individual checks conferred something of value
upon the candidate.151  In and of itself, that was sufficient to violate the
statute, whether or not the funds were segregated or commingled.152
The RSLC may not act as a “conduit” for the alleged individual
contributions for two reasons.  First, there is a statutory bar for such actions
under the North Dakota Act.153  Second, as in Harman, the RSLC, in acting
as such an intermediary, confers an unlawful corporate benefit upon a North
Dakota candidate.154  Regardless of what the “RSLC, Inc.—Individual
Account” is called, contributions from the account must be considered to be
contributions directly from the RSLC’s general funds.  Those funds are
commingled with direct corporate contributions and are illegal under North
Dakota law.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE CONUNDRUM
Presently, the enforcement mechanism available under the North
Dakota Act leaves much to be desired.155  State’s Attorneys in North
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. 59 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
148. Harmon, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-51.
149. Id. at 1054; see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 1056.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. N.D. CENT. CODE section 16.1-08.1-03.3(5) states, “[a] person may not make a
payment of that person’s money or of another person’s money to any other person for a political
purpose in any name other than that of the person who supplies the money. . . .” N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 16.1-08.1-03.3(5) (2003).
154. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Harmon, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
155. See Todd Lochner, Surveying the Landscape of State Campaign Finance Enforcement:
A Preliminary Analysis, 4 ELECTION L.J. 329, 338 (2005) (noting that North Dakota was one of
the weaker states for campaign finance auditing mechanisms).  Thus, the article concluded that
North Dakota would “have a very difficult time detecting, and consequently enforcing,
violations.”  Id.
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Dakota are charged with the primary statutory authority to prosecute
violations.156  Yet North Dakota State’s attorneys, as elected officials, are
often affiliated with one of the major political parties.  Consequently, a
State’s Attorney charged with authority to prosecute a campaign contribu-
tion violation is subject to political pressure to prosecute or not to prose-
cute, depending upon which party the offending candidate belongs to.
Another vehicle for enforcement of campaign finance laws is a request
for an opinion from the North Dakota Attorney General.157  However, the
Attorney General is also a partisan elected official subject to pressure from
one party or the other.158  Moreover, where the Attorney General is the
focus of the complaint, there is simply no adequate mechanism.  It is un-
likely that the Attorney General would look critically upon contributions to
his or her own campaign.  Furthermore, the Attorney General, as chief law
enforcement officer, has direct control over the State’s Attorneys.  A State’s
Attorney cannot reasonably be expected to prosecute a sitting Attorney
General without serious risk to his or her own political career.
Election contests do not appear to be viable either.  Campaign laws,
such as North Dakota Century Code section 16.1-08.1-03.3, impose crimi-
nal penalties for violations.159  If the office to which the offending party is
elected, then the party is subject to the impeachment process; however, no
grounds for a civil election contest exist.160  It is not reasonable to expect
consistent and unbiased enforcement of campaign finance laws by a single
elected official.  A better enforcement mechanism would be through a bi-
partisan committee established for the sole purpose of resolving campaign
finance disputes.  Such a committee could be appointed by the governor
with members of the legislature representing both parties in equal numbers.
The committee would meet as called upon to resolve questions involving
campaign issues, including finance issues such as those raised in this article.
If a ruling is requested prospectively regarding the acceptance of a particu-
lar contribution, for example, the committee ruling could absolve the re-
questing candidate or committee of any further liability should the ruling
156. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(7) (2003).
157. See, e.g., Letter Opinion 96-L-150, supra note 105.
158. See generally Christopher D. Friez, Note, What Is a Candidate? What Is a
Contribution?  An Analysis of How North Dakota’s New Campaign Finance Definitions Compare
to the Rest of the States, 80 N.D. L. REV. 441 (2004) (providing an interesting illustration of this
problem).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(8) (2003).
160. Dist. One Republican Comm. v. Dist. One Democrat Comm., 466 N.W.2d 820, 827-28
(N.D. 1991).
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later be determined to be incorrect.  A similar process is used for FEC
complaints.161
The establishment of such a committee would require legislation.
However, it should be seriously considered because of the emerging prob-
lems of otherwise unregulated campaign financing.  Because of BCRA,
states must take a larger role in campaign finance regulation.  A bi-partisan
campaign finance committee seems to be the only viable option for meeting
that obligation in a fair and meaningful way.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Contributions such as those from the RSLC do not fit well into the
North Dakota campaign finance scheme.  If the campaign contribution ac-
tivity like that of the RSLC is permissible in North Dakota, then it could be
argued that formalized PACs are no longer necessary.  Any entity desiring
to make political contributions would only need to set up a separate check-
ing account.  Moreover, any contribution could be used to fund the admini-
strative expenses of a political committee.  Such an interpretation, however,
would appear to be in direct conflict with the North Dakota Act.162  More
importantly, we need a better mechanism for dealing with problems such as
those illustrated in this article.  The adoption of a bi-partisan campaign fi-
nance regulation committee law would accomplish much to alleviate the
problems inherent in the current enforcement system.
161. See 2 U.S.C. § 437f(c) (2000) (providing that an “advisory opinion rendered by the FEC
may be relied upon by any person involved in the transaction for which the opinion [wa]s
rendered and any person involved in a transaction which is indistinguishable in all material
respects”).  The statute further provides that “any person who relies upon any provision or finding
of an advisory opinion and who acts in good faith” thereon will not be subject to sanction. 2
U.S.C. § 437f(c).
162. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1)-(2) (2003).
